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Abstract 
Purpose – The objective of this study is to understand the budgetary role of national legislatures in 
Euro Area (EA) countries and to analyse implications for fiscal discipline. 
Design/methodology/approach – Building on the budget institutions literature, a legislative 
budgetary power index for all the 19 EA countries is constructed using OECD and European 
Commission data as well as data generated from questionnaires to national authorities. A two-way 
fixed effects panel data model is then used to assess the effect of legislative budgetary power on the 
budget balance in the EA during 2006-15.  
Findings  - Overall, in the EA, formal legislative powers vis-à-vis the national budgetary process are 
weak but there is more legislative involvement in SGP procedures and legislative budgetary 
organisational capacity is generally quite good. In contrast to the traditional view in the budget 
institutions literature, our empirical findings show that strong legislative budgetary power does not 
necessarily result in larger budget deficits. 
Research limitations/implications – Data on legislative budgeting was available from different 
sources and timeseries data was very limited. 
Practical implications – There is scope to improve democratic legitimacy of the national budgetary 
process in the EA, without necessarily jeopardising fiscal discipline. 
Originality/value – The constructed legislative budgetary power index covers all the 19 EA countries 
and has a broad scope covering various novel institutional characteristics. The empirical analysis 
contributes to the scarce literature on the impact of legislative budgeting on fiscal discipline. 
1. Introduction 
The legislature, as the representative body of citizens, has a key role to ensure that budgetary 
decisions are democratically legitimate. In the Euro Area (EA), democratic accountability of 
budgetary policy is more challenging and complex. The supra-national fiscal framework – the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) – implies that the European Union (EU) institutions prescribe the 
national budgetary policy, but voters can only sanction their national governments. At the same 
time, the European Parliament does not have any effective power in the implementation of the SGP 
and national budgetary matters (Crum, 2018). Thus, democratic legitimacy for budgetary decisions 
remains within national parliaments. However, their role and relevance in the budgetary process has 
become increasingly more limited with the tighter constraints and increased surveillance by EU 
institutions implemented in response to the EA sovereign debt crises1.  Indeed, the need to 




involvement of national parliaments has been highlighted in the European Commission’s (2014) 
review of the implementation of the ‘Six-Pack’ and the ‘Two-Pack’ as well as in its communication on 
completing EMU (European Commission, 2017a). 
Meanwhile, strong legislative budgetary power, especially powers to amend the draft budget 
presented by the executive, is associated with large budget deficits (von Hagen, 2002). Through 
higher spending, legislators can favour their constituency and increase their chances of re-election. 
But its costs are borne by the general public if it is financed through higher taxation or on future 
generations if it is deficit-financed. Indeed, Alesina and Perotti (1996, p.7) explicitly refer to a “trade-
off” between fiscal discipline and democratic accountability of the budget process. However, the 
effect of legislative budgetary power is complex as legislators can also face political consequences, 
for example if the budget is not approved in time. Additionally, the involvement of the legislature in 
other aspects of the budgetary process, for example to approve medium-term budgetary plans, can 
improve their credibility and ownership, thus possibly contributing to more fiscal discipline.  
This paper aims to improve the understanding of the budgetary role of national legislatures in EA 
countries and to examine implications for fiscal discipline. Specifically, it seeks to address the 
following two research questions: what is the budgetary power of national legislatures in the EA?; 
and what is the impact of legislative budgetary power on fiscal discipline in the EA?  
Since the 1990s, various studies have measured the overall quality of budget institutions by using 
composite numerical indices which capture various institutional aspects governing the budgetary 
process. These indices generally include medium-term budgetary frameworks (MTBFs), fiscal rules, 
budgetary procedural rules as well as budget transparency. von Hagen (1992) and Hallerberg et al. 
(2007, 2009), amongst others, have applied these indices to EU countries. But these indices have a 
broader scope than legislative budgeting and only measure some elements of the legislature’s role in 
the budgetary process, mostly focusing on the budget approval stage. On the other hand, few 
studies have produced comprehensive measures of legislative budgetary power, namely Lienert 
(2005), Wehner (2006, 2010) and Ríos et al. (2018). However, these indices do not include all the EA 
countries whilst at the same time they include also other countries which are more diverse. This 
contribution adds to the scarce literature on legislative budgeting by producing a comprehensive 
legislative budgetary power index for all the 19 EA member states, which provides more analytical 
relevance since these countries are subject to a common supra-national fiscal governance 
framework. This index captures the role of the legislature throughout the preparation, approval and 
implementation stages of the budgetary process, as well as its involvement in the implementation of 
the SGP. Novel features of the index include the legislature’s involvement in fiscal rules and its 
relationship with independent fiscal councils, which, following the reforms implemented in response 
to the sovereign debt crises, now constitute a prominent feature of budget institutions in EA 
countries. The index also uses unique data on various aspects of legislative budgetary power 
generated through questionnaires to national authorities.  
The positive relationship between the quality of budget institutions and the fiscal balance is well 
established in the literature.  Studies covering EU countries include for instance Hallerberg et al. 
(2007, 2009) and De Haan et al. (2013). However, since the explanatory variable is a measure of the 
overall quality of budget institutions, it is not possible to draw conclusions on the impact of 
legislative budgeting from these studies. On the other hand, very few studies test empirically the 
effect of legislative budgetary power on the fiscal balance. These mainly comprise Wehner (2010) 
and Ríos et al. (2018), with the former focusing only on the effects of amendment powers.  
Furthermore, these studies comprise large and diverse samples which include the United States, 




distort the analysis. This paper makes an important contribution to the understudied topic of the 
impact of legislative budgeting on fiscal outcomes in the EA, by using the constructed index as an 
explanatory variable and analysing its effect on the budget balance during 2006-2015.  
In terms of policy implications, this contribution can inform reforms to budget institutions, by 
identifying specific areas where there is scope to improve the role of the legislature in the budgetary 
process and by highlighting those aspects of legislative budgeting which do not impact negatively on 
the fiscal balance. Thus, democratic accountability in the budgetary process can be strengthened 
without jeopardising fiscal discipline.  
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the literature on legislative 
budgeting. In Section 3, the methodology used to construct and compile the legislative budgetary 
power is described. The empirical model used and the estimation methods applied to assess the 
effect of legislative budgetary power on the budget balance are discussed in Section 4. The results 
for the legislative budgetary power index and of the empirical analysis are presented and discussed 
in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. Finally, Section 7 includes conclusions and policy implications 
derived from the findings. 
2. Literature Review: legislative budgeting and fiscal discipline 
The vast and established literature on budget institutions covers, to some extent, the role of the 
legislature in the budgetary process, but this has a broader scope and only captures particular 
aspects of legislative budgeting. On the other hand, there are only a few studies focusing on 
legislative budgeting, which analyse it in a more comprehensive manner. 
2.1 Measuring legislative budgeting 
Since the 1990s, various studies have produced composite numerical indices to measure the quality 
of budget institutions, which comprise “all the rules and regulations according to which budgets are 
drafted, approved and implemented” (Alesina and Perotti, 1996, p.401). Among the more prominent 
studies which capture some aspects of legislative budgeting and cover EU countries, one finds the 
seminal contribution by von Hagen (1992) for the twelve countries that were members of the 
European Economic Community at the time; Hallerberg et al. (2007, 2009) for the 15 countries that 
were members of the EU before 2004 and Gleich (2003), Yläoutinen (2004), Fabrizio and Mody 
(2006), Hallerberg et al. (2009) for central and eastern European countries that joined the EU since 
2004. 
These quality of budget institutions indices capture legislative budgeting mainly through its formal 
powers during the budget approval stage, by considering characteristics such as whether any 
restrictions apply to legislative amendments to the executive’s draft budget, whether an 
amendment can cause the fall of the government, the reversionary budget that enters into force if a 
new budget is not approved on time, and whether government can call a vote of confidence when 
the vote of the budget takes place. Most of these indices also include whether parliament’s approval 
is required for budget changes during the implementation stage, whilst the indices by von Hagen 
(1992) and Yläoutinen (2004) also take into account other aspects of the legislature’s role in 
monitoring budget performance. In contrast, the involvement of the legislature during the budget 
formulation stage is hardly captured by these indices. Moreover, legislative budgetary organisational 
capacity is included in some of the quality of budget institutions indices, but only in a limited 
manner: von Hagen (1992) and Yläoutinen (2004) include the time available for budget scrutiny 
whilst Hallerberg et al. (2009) capture the comprehensiveness of the budget document presented to 




More recently, in an index which focuses on budgetary analytical capacity in the 15 EA countries that 
are members of the OECD, Kasperskaya and Xifré (2020) measure legislative budgetary organisation 
capacity more broadly, by including comprehensiveness of information available to the legislature, 
whether the legislature can rely on a specialised budget research office to undertake budget 
analyses and time for budget scrutiny. However, this index  does not include elements of formal 
legislative budgetary power. 
Finally, the European Commission (2020) produces indices focusing on medium-term budgetary 
frameworks (MTBF) and fiscal rules for all the EU member states, which capture a limited aspect of 
legislative budgeting. In particular, these indices capture characteristics such as parliament’s role vis-
à-vis these numerical budgetary constraints, such as whether the MTBF is presented in parliament 
and whether there is a vote;  and whether parliament is involved in monitoring respect of the MTBF 
in the annual budget and in monitoring compliance with the fiscal rule. 
There are very few available measures dedicated exclusively to the measurement of legislative 
budgetary power, which Wehner (2006, p.768) defines as: “the power to scrutinise and influence 
budget policy and to ensure its implementation”. Lienert (2005) and Wehner (2006, 2010) use 
survey-based data from the OECD/World Bank to produce legislative budgetary power indices, which 
cover around 30 countries. On the other hand, Ríos et al.’s (2018) legislative budgetary oversight 
index, uses data from the Open Budget Survey by the International Budget Partnership and covers a 
larger and more diverse sample of 75 countries. However, this index focuses more on aspects 
concerning budget transparency. All these indices include legislative amendment powers, some 
measure of legislative control during budget implementation and some aspects of the legislature’s 
budgetary organisational capacity. Lienert’s (2005) and Ríos et al.’s (2018) indices also include some 
elements relating to the legislature’s role during budget preparation. However, Wehner’s (2006, 
2010) index has the broadest scope and also distinguishes between the legislature’s formal 
budgetary power and its organisational capacity2. Moreover, by adopting a multiplicative approach 
to aggregate formal powers and organisational capacity, Wehner (2006, 2010) assumes that a 
certain degree of both is required for the legislature to influence the budget process. On the other 
hand,  the other indices involve a linear aggregation method, thus assuming substitutability between 
all institutional characteristics. For example, strong amendment powers can compensate for a lack of 
technical support to the legislature from a specialised budget research office. A more recent index 
by Stapenhurst et al. (2019) focuses on ex-post parliamentary budgetary oversight, i.e. legislative 
budgetary scrutiny during budget implementation, and covers 60 countries, using Inter-
Parliamentary Union Parline database between 2015 and 2016. 
These studies have found considerable variation in the degree of legislative budgetary power among 
the countries included in their respective samples, which has been mainly attributed to whether a 
country has a presidential or parliamentary system and to other political factors, namely minority 
governments and party discipline. It is relevant to point out that these indices measure legislative 
influence over the budget through its institutional characteristics, rather than through direct 
measures of policy influence, such as the actual amendments made by the legislature to the 
executive’s budget proposal and their magnitude. However, data constraints limit the possibility of 
measuring this. Furthermore, other legislative influences over the budget, for example using 
informal contacts with the executive and anticipatory behaviour by the executive during budget 
formulation, are very difficult to quantify.  




Legislators, like spending ministers, face  the fiscal commons problem: they enjoy the full benefits of 
higher public spending, in terms of constituency support and electoral success, but they do not take 
full account of its financing cost, since the burden of increased taxation falls on the general public 
(Weingast et al. 1981). Additionally, if the higher public spending  is financed through borrowing, the 
cost of debt falls on future generations, which creates an incentive for deficit-financed spending 
(Velasco, 2000). The incentive for deficit-financed spending is exacerbated during electoral periods 
(Alesina and Perotti, 1996), as legislators become more concerned with their electoral chances and 
discount more the future tax burden of financing higher current spending. Since the common pool 
problem intensifies as the number of decision makers increases, the fiscal commons problem is 
accentuated in the legislature, as the number of members in a legislature is higher than the number 
of spending ministers in cabinet whilst legislatures also contain more political parties than the 
executive (von Hagen, 2002). Thus, strong legislative budgetary power, such as unrestricted 
amendment powers, is expected to result in higher public spending and larger budget deficits. 
However, legislators may also face political consequences from proposing amendments to, or 
rejecting the executive’s budget proposal, such as when, in parliamentary systems, this is considered 
as a vote of no confidence in the government (Wehner, 2006). Moreover, some characteristics of 
legislative budgeting can possibly contribute to more fiscal discipline. For example, legislative 
approval of the MTBF (Lienert, 2010) as well as its involvement in monitoring compliance with the 
medium-term budgetary targets and with the fiscal rules can improve its ownership and 
commitment to these numerical budgetary constraints. Another example involves stronger 
legislative power during budget implementation:  a more binding budget law can prevent 
expenditure slippages over and above the appropriated amounts (Lienert, 2010). Thus, the 
relationship between legislative budgetary power and fiscal discipline is complex and can vary across 
different institutional characteristics. 
The positive relationship between the overall quality of budget institutions and fiscal discipline is 
well established in the literature. Empirical studies covering EA countries include, amongst others, 
Hallerberg et al. (2007, 2009) and De Haan et al. (2013). However, few studies attempt to 
disentangle the effect of legislative budgeting, from other institutional characteristics. In small 
sample studies comprising ten central and eastern European countries during 1994-2004, Gleich 
(2003) and Fabrizio and Mody (2006) assess the effect of legislative budgetary amendment powers 
by using a component of their quality of budget institutions indices: they find that strong legislative 
budgetary amendment powers conflict with fiscal discipline. In contrast, using a more 
comprehensive measure for the role of the legislature during the budget approval process, 
Yläoutinen (2004) does not find comparable results for a similar sample of countries.  
Meanwhile, using a more comprehensive measure of legislative budgetary power in a cross-sectional 
analysis of 28 OECD countries during 2001-05, Wehner (2010) finds that an increase in legislative 
budgetary power results in higher levels of public spending. When testing for the separate effect of 
the different aspects of legislative budgeting, the amendment powers sub-index was found to have a 
significant effect. The relevance of amendment powers was confirmed when this constituted the 
only institutional explanatory variable in a cross-sectional analysis for a larger and more diverse 
sample of 80 countries during 1990-98. 
Giurato et al. (2016) use Wehner’s (2010) index to assess the impact of legislative budgetary power 
on forecast errors in the budget balance for 13 EU countries during 1999-2013. Using a panel data 
model, with fixed (time) effects, they find that stronger legislative budgetary powers negatively 




it presents more favourable economic and fiscal forecasts when anticipating legislative amendments 
or possibly even the rejection of the proposed budget.  
Finally, Ríos et al. (2018) use their legislative budgetary oversight indicator to assess simultaneously 
its impact on the budget balance and on budget transparency. Using cross-sectional analysis 
covering 75 countries for 2009, they find a negative and significant relationship with the budget 
balance, but a positive effect on budget transparency. 
3. A legislative budgetary power index for the EA countries 
The legislative budgetary power index presented in this paper expands on the index developed by 
Wehner (2006, 2010). It similarly distinguishes between formal powers and organisational capacity. 
However, the constructed index has a broader scope as it measures legislative budgetary power in a 
detailed manner throughout the budget formulation, approval and implementation stages. 
Furthermore, it also captures the legislature’s involvement in the implementation of the SGP 
procedures, as well as its involvement in fiscal rules and its relationship with the fiscal council, which 
all constitute novel features in the literature on legislative budgeting.  
The index consists of two main components: formal legislative budgetary power, which in turn 
comprises the involvement of the legislature in the national budgetary process and in SGP 
procedures; and legislative budgetary organisational capacity. Formal legislative power in the 
national budgetary process is measured through six sub-indices, comprising 24 variables, whilst 
legislative involvement in SGP procedures involves three sub-indices with 19 variables. Finally, the 
legislative budgetary organisational capacity component consists of five sub-indices comprising 16 
variables. A detailed description of these variables is provided in Table I in the Appendix.  
For formal powers vis-à-vis the national budgetary process, the first legislative role considered 
concerns the budget preparation stage through legislative involvement in the MTBF and fiscal rules. 
This includes whether parliament approves the MTBF and its role in monitoring and enforcing 
compliance of the numerical budget constraints. Such characteristics can possibly contribute 
towards more fiscal discipline through wider ownership and improved credibility of the numerical 
budgetary constraints (Lienert, 2010).  
Formal legislative budget amendment powers constitute the most prominent role for legislative 
budgeting. However, such powers can be constrained by restrictions, such as a deficit or spending 
constraint (Wehner, 2006). They can also be weakened if rejecting the draft budget is considered as 
a vote of no-confidence in the government (von Hagen, 1992) and also if the executive has veto 
powers. The reversionary budget can also diminish legislative budgetary power, particularly if there 
is reversion to the executive’s draft budget if the budget is not approved (Wehner, 2006). 
During budget implementation, executive flexibility to cut or cancel, re-allocate or increase spending 
can further undermine legislative amendment powers. On the other hand, a more binding budget 
law can prevent expenditure slippages during budget implementation, thereby contributing to more 
fiscal discipline (von Hagen, 1992). Similarly, required legislative authorisation for off-budget 
expenditures and contingent liabilities not only imply more comprehensive legislative control over 
the budget but also contributes towards more budget transparency, thus providing another example 
of how legislative budgetary power can result in more fiscal restraint.  
Strong legislative involvement in SGP procedures can also contribute to more fiscal discipline, 
through more national ownership and commitment to the relevant budgetary constraints. The 




procedures: the Stability Programme (SP), which comprises medium-term budgetary targets; the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), which sets binding ceilings on the budget balance and 
government debt; and the Draft Budgetary Plan (DBP), which constitutes the more recently added 
direct scrutiny by the European Commission before the budget is approved by the national 
parliament. Drawing on Hallerberg et al. (2011), who examine more broadly legislative involvement 
in the European Semester3 in six EU countries, the index measures legislative involvement in the SGP 
through whether the relevant national and EU documents are presented to and/or discussed in the 
legislature. Legislative influence is considered to be stronger if it is involved before a document is 
sent to the EU institutions and before a relevant Council meeting. Similarly, due to its specialised 
expertise, involvement at a budget committee level is expected to result in more effective 
engagement of the legislature in the implementation of the SGP.  
Despite extensive formal powers, the legislature’s influence over the budget may be hindered by 
weaknesses in its budgetary organisational capacity. A key requirement is having sufficient time to 
scrutinise the budget. Moreover, a specialised budget committee contributes to legislative 
budgetary power through the development of specialised expertise and through its centralised 
structure can result in a more comprehensive view of the budget (Wehner, 2006). In addition, 
comprehensive budget documentation and  access to budgetary information (von Hagen, 1992) as 
well as the establishment of an independent and non-partisan fiscal analysis capacity within the 
legislature can reduce the information asymmetry between the legislature and the executive 
(Lienert, 2010). Finally, as shown by case studies involving five EU countries, fiscal councils can also 
provide the legislature with another source of budgetary information, independent from the 
executive (Fasone and Griglio, 2013), thus strengthening its ability to undertake scrutiny and 
oversight of the budget. Parliament can also become more aware of fiscal sustainability issues 
through interaction with the IFI, for example by having parliament auditioning the fiscal council 
during the budgetary process and by summoning the leadership of the IFI to respond to legislative 
questions.   
3.1 Data sources and methodology used to construct the index 
The legislative budgetary power index was compiled using data from the OECD’s (2012) budgeting 
practices and procedures database and the European Commission’s (2016a, 2016b) fiscal 
governance databases as well as a minor input from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) (2015) 
fiscal councils dataset (Table I in the Appendix). Most of this data was available online but other 
data, providing unique, detailed information on the budgetary process in EA countries, from the 
European Commission’s fiscal governance databases was obtained in May 2016 following requests 
to the relevant officials in the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs. In addition, 
data for various components of the index was generated through a questionnaire directed to the 
national authorities of each EA member state. For the non-OECD EA countries (Cyprus, Lithuania, 
Latvia and Malta), the questionnaire was also used to generate matching data to that available for 
the OECD countries from the OECD budgeting practices and procedures database. The participants 
mainly included officials from budget offices and finance ministries, from fiscal councils, 
parliamentary budget offices and parliamentary budget or finance committees. Other data sources, 
namely finance ministries, parliamentary and fiscal councils websites, legal texts and official 
documents, were also used to fill some gaps in the datasets and also, where possible to corroborate 
the data.  
The data was compiled during May-December 2016, with the cut-off date being 31 December 2016. 




the data generated through questionnaires refers to 2016. Thus, this data captures the new EA fiscal 
governance framework introduced between 2010 and 2013.  
The scoring scheme applied to the different characteristics of legislative budgeting has a range from 
zero to ten, with ten indicating the strongest legislative budgetary power and zero the weakest. The 
maximum score of ten is equally distributed over the range of possible responses for each variable. 
With few exceptions, equal weights are generally assigned to the different components (Table I in 
the Appendix). This has the advantage of simplicity and reflects the fact that there is no theoretical 
or empirical basis for assigning more importance to particular institutional characteristics. The 
sensitivity of the results to alternative weighting schemes was tested using Spearman rank 
correlations.  
To aggregate the different components into a single index score, a blended additive and 
multiplicative approach, as in Wehner’s (2006, 2010) index is used. Formal legislative budgetary 
powers and organisational capacity are aggregated using a multiplicative approach, thus assuming 
that a certain degree of both is required for legislative influence over the budget. On the other hand, 
as established in the budget institutions literature, substitutability is assumed between different 
institutional characteristics: thus for the different sub-indices for formal powers and organisational 
capacity.  
4. Empirical model – legislative budgetary power and fiscal discipline in the EA 
The empirical analysis involves a panel data model for the EA countries during 2006-2015. In order 
to introduce some time-variation in the legislative budgetary power explanatory variable, another 
index was constructed, mostly referring to 2007, thus before the sovereign debt crises in the EA. 
However, this index has a narrower scope since it was compiled using only secondary data from the 
OECD 2007 budgetary practices and procedures database and from the European Commission 
(2016a, 2016b) fiscal governance databases. Thus, whilst the composition of formal legislative power 
vis-à-vis the national budgetary process is similar, data for the involvement of the legislature in the 
SGP was not available and the legislative budget organisational capacity does not include the 
relationship of the legislature with the independent fiscal council4. This index also has more limited 
geographical coverage since data for Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta is not available 
from the OECD 2007 survey. Whilst these factors and other differences in the OECD and European 
Commission databases imply that the two indices are not directly comparable5, there is sufficient 
similarity between the two and their use allows two data readings for legislative budgetary power 
for most EA countries, one applied from 2006 to 2011 and the other from 2012 to 20156. 
The panel data model takes the following general form: 
FISCALit = β0 + β1ECONit + β2POLit + β3PRESSUREit + β4INDEXit + μi + νt + ɛit 
The dependent variable  is the general government budget balance as a ratio to the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) and the explanatory variable of interest is the legislative budgetary power index. 
Following the literature on the fiscal impact of budget institutions, the model also includes economic 
and political control variables. A description of these variables together with their relevant data 
sources is presented in Table II in the Appendix.  
As in various empirical models which assess the impact of budget institutions on the fiscal balance, 
for example Yläoutinen (2004) and Hallerberg and Yläoutinen (2010), real GDP growth and the 
unemployment rate capture the effects of economic fluctuations on the fiscal balance. Economic 




results in a worsening of the fiscal position. The first political control variable captures the effect of 
the electoral cycle: the fiscal balance is expected to deteriorate in the year when elections take place 
as the incumbent uses the budget to increase the likelihood of re-election (Mink and De Haan, 2006; 
Efthyvoulou, 2012). Secondly, reflecting the common pool resource problem, government 
fragmentation, as found in coalition governments comprising different political parties, is also 
expected to affect negatively the fiscal balance as bargaining on the budget within cabinet is more 
difficult and less centralised (von Hagen, 2002).  The third political control variable refers to 
government’s margin of majority in parliament, which is expected to have a positive effect on the 
budget balance. Firstly, a stronger parliamentary majority strengthens the executive’s power vis-à-
vis the legislature, so that it is less likely to give in to amendments involving higher spending. 
Furthermore, in the case of a coalition government, a stronger parliamentary majority also weakens 
the influence of any member of the coalition which facilitates control over spending demands by 
coalition partners (Volkerink and De Haan, 2001). The last political control variable concerns 
government’s ideological orientation to test for the traditional partisan view that left-wing 
governments are associated more with larger budget deficits than right-wing governments. Debrun 
and Kumar (2007) and Nerlich and Reuter (2013), amongst others, similarly include an ideological 
variable in their empirical models testing for the effect of budget institutions on the fiscal balance.   
In addition, as in Hallerberg et al. (2007, 2009), the model also includes the lagged government debt 
ratio, which provides a proxy for the long-term fiscal sustainability to which the budget balance 
reacts. Finally, the last control variable involves a dummy variable to indicate whether a country was 
subject to a financial assistance programme. Both imply more pressure for governments to 
implement fiscal consolidation and are thus expected to result in an improved budget balance.  
We estimate the model using two-way fixed effects with country and time dummies7. The time 
dummies can account for common shocks to all countries in a given year, although cross-sectional 
correlations are constrained to be the same for all units (Hoechle, 2007). On the other hand, the 
country fixed effects capture time-invariant social, political and other country-specific determinants 
of the budget balance. To test for the robustness of the results, we also estimate the model using 
alternative methods and also use different fiscal indicators for the dependent variable.  
Finally, whilst the use of a composite index as an explanatory variable has the advantage of 
combining different indicators into a single measure, it may mask offsetting elements.  This is 
particularly relevant for legislative budgetary power where the effect on fiscal discipline may vary 
across different institutional characteristics. Thus, the analysis is extended through a more 
disaggregated approach where the overall legislative budgetary power index is replaced with its 
different sub-indices. 
5. Results for the legislative budgetary power index 
The score results for the legislative budgetary power index and its sub-indices are presented in Table 
I and Figure 1. In Table I, the 19 EA countries are grouped into three categories: top, medium and 
low score categories, referring to the top, second and third, and bottom quartiles, respectively. The 
results were tested for robustness by using alternative weighting structures, namely that using 
expert opinion in Kim’s (2015) index and another option using different weights for the legislative 
involvement in the national budgetary process and in the implementation of the SGP. The sensitivity 
of the results was also tested by using an alternative linear additive approach to aggregate the 
formal legislative budgetary power and organisational capacity components. In all cases, the 
Spearman rank correlation coefficient is 0.9 or higher and significant8. 




The results for the legislative budgetary power index were also compared to those in previous 
studies where country scores are available, namely Lienert (2005), Wehner (2010) and Kim (2015), 
by adjusting the samples to have the same geographical coverage. However, the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficients are low (0.3 or less) and not significant. This probably reflects the limited 
comparability with the indices as the constructed index has a much broader scope and also the 
different time periods covered by the indices.  
Our results show that the median EA score for the legislative budgetary power index is at just below 
3. The scores range from a high of 4.2 to a low of 0.6. The only two countries with presidential 
systems (Lithuania and Cyprus) fall within the top and medium score categories, respectively. On the 
other hand, the country with the lowest score (Malta) is the only member state which had a single-
party majority government throughout the period under review. However, the index scores for other 
countries which had a single-party majority government for part of the period under review differed 
considerably – for instance France had the highest score, Spain, Greece and Portugal had medium 
scores and Slovakia had a low score. Thus, it is difficult to draw conclusions on how the political and 
government systems affect legislative budgetary power from the small sample of EA countries.  
The findings show that legislative budgetary power is particularly weak for formal powers in the 
national budgetary process (median value of 2.9). On the other hand, overall legislative involvement 
in SGP procedures is rather strong whilst legislatures have a fair degree of budgetary organisational 
capacity (median values of 7.3 and 5.9, respectively). Organisational capacity is quite malleable and 
can be reformed more easily than formal powers, which tend to be enshrined in a country’s 
legislation or even its constitution (Wehner, 2010). Indeed, the findings indicate that some 
legislatures may be countering their limited formal powers through strong organisational capacity, 
for example France and Finland in the top score index category and Spain and Italy in the medium 
score category. 
At a sub-index level, as shown in Figure 1, legislative budgetary power is particularly lacking during 
the budget formulation stage. This contrasts with the OECD’s (2015, p.8) Recommendation on 
Budgetary Governance which calls for parliamentary engagement in the budget process also ex-ante. 
The results show that there is legislative involvement in monitoring respect of the MTBF targets in 
the annual budget in only two member states (Netherlands and Portugal) and the legislature 
monitors compliance with the fiscal rule only in Portugal. In addition, although the MTBF is discussed 
in parliament in 16 member states, there is a vote in only nine of them. As highlighted by Lienert 
(2010), legislative endorsement of the medium-term budgetary targets can improve their credibility 
and ownership. 
On the other hand, during the budget approval stage, EA countries have strong formal amendment 
powers. All but two member states (Greece and Ireland)9 have the power to amend the executive’s 
budget proposal and such powers are unrestricted in nine countries. Nevertheless, such formal 
legislative power can be mitigated in practice, particularly in the 12 member states (including six 
with unrestricted amendment powers), where a vote on the budget is considered as a vote of 
confidence in the government. Furthermore, in Finland and Latvia, the reversionary budget further 
weakens their unrestricted amendment powers, because if the budget is not approved in time, the 
executive budget’s proposal takes effect.  
During the implementation stage of the budgetary process, in the EA, the executive generally has 
strong power to re-allocate spending among different budget items and also to cut or cancel 




only found in five member states10. Such executive flexibility to depart from the approved budget 
further dilutes legislative budgetary power. 
As regards involvement in SGP procedures, there is generally a good degree of engagement of the 
parliamentary budget or finance committee, with all or most of the documents considered discussed 
regularly. On the other hand, whilst the Stability Programme is presented and discussed in 
parliament in 14 member states, there is a vote in only two countries (Italy and France). Finally, 
there is considerable scope to improve the timeliness of legislative discussions on the opinions, 
recommendations or decisions by EU institutions on the different SGP procedures, since such 
discussion takes place before the relevant Council meeting in only four countries, thus limiting the 
scope for legislative influence.  
Budget committees also constitute a strong feature of legislative budgetary organisational capacity 
in most EA countries: in 13 countries, this committee co-ordinates the whole budgetary process. 
Members of budget/finance committees generally have long tenures (of four years or more or equal 
to the electoral term), which facilitates the development of expertise in the committees. Strong 
parliamentary budget committees not only facilitate legislative budgetary influence, but at the same 
time, through their centralised structure, can possibly have a role akin to a strong finance minister, 
thus contributing to more fiscal discipline.  
Lack of budgetary information can constitute a disadvantage for the legislature vis-à-vis the 
executive. Our findings show that this does not constitute a particular challenge in the EA as 
legislatures generally have good access to budgetary information. In particular, in the annual budget 
documentation presented to the legislature, new revenue-raising measures are always distinguished 
in 14 EA countries; and the legislature is informed automatically on the implementation of the 
budget and explanations of deviations from the budget are provided in 17 countries. Most EA 
countries also perform well in terms of financial information included in the budget documentation 
and the public availability of budgetary information and methodologies applied. Our results also 
show that legislatures in the EA generally have adequate time available for budget scrutiny with 
eleven countries allowing two months, which corresponds to the minimum suggested by Lienert 
(2010), whilst four countries allow more time, with a maximum of four months. 
On the other hand, specialised budget research offices are not a common institutional feature in the 
EA, being found in only eight countries and these tend to be rather small, with half of them having 
less than ten staff. However, our findings suggest that fiscal councils have become an alternative 
source of budgetary expertise for legislatures in EA countries. In fact, despite being a recent 
institutional development, in 16 member states, reports by the fiscal council are submitted to the 
legislature and these generally constitute an important input in legislative budget debates. 
Furthermore, in 14 countries, the legislature and/or its budget or finance committee summons the 
fiscal council’s leadership at least once a year.  
6. Results of the regression analysis 
The results of the two-way fixed effects panel data model with the legislative budgetary power index 
as the main explanatory variable of interest are shown in Table II (column 1). 
[insert Table II around here] 
As expected, stronger real GDP growth is associated with an improved fiscal balance, whilst the 
unemployment rate exerts a negative effect. However, only the unemployment rate has a significant 




evidence of an electoral budget cycle. This contrasts with previous findings by von Hagen (2003) and 
Buti and van der Noord (2004) for the EU15 and by Mink and De Haan (2006) for the EA countries, 
for the few years around and after the launch of the monetary union; as well as by Efthyvoulou 
(2012) for the EU27 countries during 1997-2008. The divergent findings could reflect the different 
period covered in the analysis, with electoral manoeuvring possibly being more difficult to 
implement during and in the aftermath of the economic and financial crisis. We also find that the 
other political variables do not exert a significant effect on the fiscal balance. The coefficient of the 
bailout dummy is also not significant.  
On the other hand, the lagged government debt ratio has a significant positive effect on the budget 
balance. Debrun and Kumar (2007) and Nerlich and Reuter (2013) find similar results for the lagged 
debt variable for their samples of EU countries during 1990-2004 and 1990-2012, respectively. 
Moreover, as in this study, they also do not find significant budgetary influence from political 
variables. 
Turning to the legislative budgetary power index, its coefficient is positive, which does not support 
the general view of a conflict between more democratic budgetary procedures and fiscal discipline. 
However, it is not statistically significant. When testing for robustness of the results by using 
alternative measures of the budget balance, the results were generally confirmed with a positive but 
insignificant relationship. In addition, the coefficient of the legislative budgetary power index 
remains generally positive when using alternative estimation methods and with some methods, it is 
also statistically significant11.  
This finding contrasts with the results in Ríos et al. (2018), whereas in Wehner (2010) and Giuriato et 
al. (2016) stronger legislative budgetary power is also associated with higher public spending levels 
and less fiscal forecast accuracy. Whilst the specification of the empirical model and the timeframe 
covered by the analysis differ, the divergent results can be attributed to the more comprehensive 
measure of legislative budgetary power, which also includes institutional characteristics that can 
contribute to fiscal discipline.  
Finally, the analysis is extended with a more disaggregated approach where the legislative budgetary 
power index is replaced by individual sub-indices12. Given the sample size, the different sub-indices 
are included separately in the model (Table II - columns 2 to 9). The results for the control variables 
are broadly similar to those of the main empirical model. Meanwhile, most of the coefficients of the 
legislative budgeting sub-indices are insignificant. In particular, in contrast with the traditional strong 
view in the literature on budget institutions of a trade-off between strong legislative amendment 
powers and fiscal discipline, the coefficient of the variable which specifically captures restrictions on 
legislative budget amendment powers, albeit being negative, is not statistically significant (column 5 
in Table II). On the other hand, there is a positive influence on the budget balance from legislative 
involvement in the MTBF, which is significant at the 10% level. A strong role for the legislature in the 
MTBF can improve its credibility, through more respect of the medium-term budgetary targets. 
Legislative budgetary power through the reversionary budget (for instance, through government 
shutdown or limited access to budgetary funds) is also found to contribute significantly to fiscal 
discipline. This could be due to strategic anticipatory behaviour by the executive to make sure that 
the proposed budget is accepted. However, this merits further study. Finally, legislative budgetary 
organisational capacity also exerts a significant positive effect on the fiscal balance (albeit only at the 
10% level). However, this impact cannot be attributed to a particular institutional feature since at a 
sub-index level, although all the coefficients of the respective organisational sub-indices are positive, 




7. Policy implications and conclusions 
This paper presents a new comprehensive legislative budgetary index for all the 19 EA member 
states, covering the formulation, approval and implementation stages of the budgetary process. It 
comprises formal legislative budgetary power, both vis-à-vis the national budgetary process and the 
implementation of SGP procedures, as well as budgetary organisational capacity. This index is used 
in a two-way fixed effects panel empirical model for the EA countries during 2006-2015 to assess the 
effect of legislative budgetary power on the budget balance. 
The index score results show that overall, legislatures in EA countries have relatively weak budgetary 
power, especially for formal legislative power vis-à-vis the national budgetary process. On the other 
hand, countries fare better as regards legislative involvement in the implementation of SGP 
procedures and organisational budgetary capacity is also generally quite good. Furthermore, the 
results from the empirical model show that strong legislative budgetary power does not necessarily 
result in worse fiscal balances. This corroborates with the findings from Wehner’s (2001) case study 
on the German parliament during 1998-2001, where strong parliamentary budgetary influence, as 
reflected in the numerous amendments to the executive’s draft budget, either maintained or even 
improved the budget balance through expenditure cuts. Thus, democratic accountability in the 
budgetary process can be improved without jeopardising fiscal discipline.  
In particular, our findings show that there is considerable scope for a stronger legislative role vis-à-
vis the national MTBF and national fiscal rules. These numerical budgetary constraints not only 
constitute prominent elements in the EA fiscal governance framework, but our empirical findings 
also show that legislative involvement in the MTBF contributes positively to fiscal discipline. Political 
commitment to the MTBF can be strengthened by requiring a parliamentary vote on the MTBF and 
particularly if this is complemented with a role in monitoring respect of the medium-term budgetary 
targets. This can involve requiring a monitoring report to be presented in parliament, as found in 
France and Luxembourg, for example.  
Meanwhile, although EA countries perform rather well as regards legislative involvement in the 
implementation of SGP procedures, our results show that, legislative influence can be improved 
through more timely discussion. This would strengthen democratic accountability of the EA fiscal 
governance, which constitutes a priority for the reform process to complete the economic and 
monetary union (European Commission, 2017a). 
There is potential to strengthen legislative budgetary power through improved organisational 
capacity since this can be reformed more easily than formal legislative powers. In particular, 
developing further relations with independent fiscal institutions can strengthen the legislature’s 
ability to scrutinise and carry out oversight of the budget. This can also contribute to more fiscal 
discipline as our empirical results show a significant positive relationship between legislative 
budgetary organisational capacity and the budget balance.  
Finally, there is scope for further research on legislative budgeting, for example as regards the 
political determinants of legislative budgetary power, but this would require extending the sample 
beyond the EA countries, since these mostly comprise parliamentary systems with coalition 
governments. The study of legislative budgeting could also be deepened through qualitative case 




1 These comprised the ‘Six-Pack’ and ‘Two-Pack’ legislative packages and the Fiscal Compact, which is 
contained within the Inter-Governmental Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination and Governance in the Economic 
and Monetary Union. Further details are available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-
euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-
correction/stability-and-growth-pact_en. 
2 Kim (2015) has developed further Wehner’s (2006, 2010) index by using an alternative weighting structure, 
based on expert opinion, and applying it to a broader and more diverse sample of 60 countries. 
3 The European Semester is the EU process for policy coordination among the member states as regards both 
macroeconomic (including budgetary) policy as well as structural reforms. 
4 Further details on the composition of the 2007 legislative budgetary power index are available from the 
authors upon request. 
5 It is not possible to estimate the model separately with the different indices because data constraints imply 
that there is no time variation in the indices during 2006-2011 and 2012-2016 respectively.  
6 When analysing the fiscal impact of the quality of budget institutions, De Haan et al. (1999), Fabrizio and 
Mody (2006), Hallerberg et al. (2007, 2009), Hallerberg and Yläoutinen (2010) and De Haan et al. (2013) have 
all worked with similar data constraints. 
7 Although shocks to the budget balance are expected to persist, a dynamic specification to the model was not 
adopted, in view of the limited sample size available. 
8 The results of these tests are not being reported due to limits of space but are available from the authors 
upon request. 
9 In these two countries, the legislature can only approve or reject the draft budget. 
10 On the other hand, in the EA, legislatures have more control over off-budget items and contingent liabilities, 
since legislative authorisation is generally required. 
11 The alternative fiscal measures used are the primary budget balance, the cyclically adjusted balance, the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance (all as a share of GDP) and the annual change in the government debt ratio 
to GDP. The alternative estimation methods used are pooled ordinary least squares, random effects, one-way 
fixed effects, first-differencing and fixed effects with Driscoll and Kraay corrected standard errors. The results 
are available from the authors upon request. 
12 The impact of legislative involvement in SGP procedures and the relationship between the legislature and 
the fiscal council cannot be estimated since there is only a single data reading of these variables. 
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Table I: Legislative budgetary power index – results 
 Top score category Medium score category Low score category 
 FR LT FI AT NL CY ES DE EL IT EE PT IE LV LU BE SI SK MT 
Legislative budgetary power index 4.2 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.3 0.6 
Legislative budgetary formal powers 5.3 6.0 4.6 5.7 5.9 4.4 3.6 4.6 4.9 3.5 4.2 4.2 4.5 3.9 3.7 3.4 3.9 2.9 2.4 
Involvement of legislature in national 
budgetary process 
3.8 5.2 2.2 4.0 4.1 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.7 4.1 2.6 4.1 2.6 3.1 3.4 2.5 3.4 2.9 2.9 
Involvement of legislature in MTBF 6.3 3.8 0.8 2.5 5.8 0.8 1.3 2.5 4.2 5.4 0.8 6.3 0.8 3.8 5.0 0.8 3.3 1.7 0.0 
Involvement of legislature in fiscal rules 0.0 6.7 0.0 3.3 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 
Legislative budgetary amendment powers 3.3 7.5 6.7 10.0 4.2 5.6 7.5 6.7 3.3 4.2 2.5 8.3 1.7 6.7 6.7 5.0 6.4 8.3 5.0 
Reversionary budget 6.7 6.7 0.0 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 10.0 6.7 6.7 10.0 3.3 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 
Legislative authorisation for changes to the 
budget during implementation 
6.5 6.7 5.8 1.3 4.6 1.9 0.8 1.1 1.8 5.0 2.1 1.7 3.0 5.2 2.2 2.2 4.2 0.8 0.8 
Legislative authorisation of off-budget 
expenditures and contingent liabilities 
5.0 10.0 7.5 10.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 2.5 7.5 10.0 2.5 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 
Involvement of legislature in SGP 
procedures 
8.2 7.6 9.2 9.0 9.6 8.3 5.4 8.2 9.3 2.4 7.3 4.4 8.5 5.3 4.3 5.2 4.9 2.8 1.3 
Discussion of SGP documents in the 
legislature 
6.6 4.9 7.7 7.1 8.8 4.9 4.5 6.5 7.8 2.0 4.7 4.0 7.4 4.2 3.6 5.3 5.5 2.1 0.5 
Discussion of SGP documents in legislative 
committees 
8.0 8.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 2.0 10.0 6.0 8.0 5.0 5.0 7.0 6.0 3.0 0.0 
Legislature informed on implementation of 
EDP 
10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 6.7 n/a 10.0 3.3 n/a 3.3 10.0 6.7 n/a 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Legislative budgetary organisational 
capacity 
7.9 6.0 7.2 5.8 5.4 6.7 8.3 6.4 5.9 7.9 6.6 6.4 5.1 5.7 5.4 4.6 3.5 4.5 2.4 
Time available for budget scrutiny 5.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 
Characteristics of legislative budget 
committees 
8.8 8.5 8.3 7.3 4.5 7.5 10.0 10.0 9.5 8.8 9.5 9.5 5.0 7.0 10.0 7.5 9.5 8.3 0.0 
Specialised budget research office 10.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 7.5 7.5 5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Access to budgetary information 8.9 9.0 9.0 7.8 8.7 7.4 6.3 8.1 7.3 6.9 8.5 7.4 8.1 7.5 7.0 7.4 5.3 7.5 7.0 




Data refers to 2012, 2014, 2016. 





Table II - Empirical model for legislative budgetary power and its sub-indices (dependent variable – general government budget balance % of GDP) 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
% change in real GDP 0.044 0.073 0.090 0.060 0.068 0.047 0.058 0.068 0.024 
 (0.623) (0.362) (0.305) (0.463) (0.411) (0.543) (0.466) (0.390) (0.782) 
Unemployment rate -0.362** -0.211 -0.203 -0.360** -0.351** -0.309** -0.353** -0.349** -0.363** 
 (0.018) (0.156) (0.160) (0.023) (0.028) (0.045) (0.035) (0.037) (0.024) 
Govt debt ratio in year t-1 0.086*** 0.075*** 0.075** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.084*** 0.093*** 0.109*** 0.092*** 
 (0.002) (0.009) (0.015) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Legislative Election Held 0.022 -0.128 -0.109 -0.005 -0.016 0.021 0.002 -0.072 0.018 
 (0.931) (0.626) (0.674) (0.983) (0.945) (0.931) (0.992) (0.771) (0.942) 
Margin of Majority 3.345 4.852 4.059 2.677 2.896 1.164 2.908 2.536 2.843 
 (0.445) (0.183) (0.265) (0.503) (0.459) (0.765) (0.514) (0.541) (0.473) 
Government Fractionalization Index 0.504 0.374 0.664 1.641 1.334 1.729 1.420 1.630 0.159 
 (0.835) (0.824) (0.721) (0.496) (0.599) (0.510) (0.569) (0.487) (0.948) 
Government ideology 0.137 0.180 0.170 0.384 0.349 0.349 0.268 0.318 0.109 
 (0.761) (0.551) (0.619) (0.389) (0.382) (0.318) (0.549) (0.472) (0.825) 
Bailout dummy variable -1.387 -1.952 -2.101 -1.383 -1.223 -1.282 -1.241 -1.736 -1.957 
 (0.566) (0.315) (0.275) (0.569) (0.642) (0.586) (0.598) (0.467) (0.419) 
Legislative budgetary power index 0.747         
 (0.315)         
Legislative involvement in MTBF  0.524*        
  (0.084)        
Legislative involvement in fiscal rules   -0.031       
   (0.688)       
Legislative budgetary amendment powers    0.158      
    (0.354)      
Restrictions on amendment powers     -0.261     
     (0.450)     
Reversionary budgets      0.564**    
      (0.014)    
Legislative control - budget implementation       0.179   
       (0.487)   
Authorisation of off-budget expenditures        -0.195  
        (0.217)  
Legislative budgetary organisational capacity         0.918* 
         (0.058) 
Constant -6.556* -7.457** -5.847** -6.890* -3.929 -8.037*** -6.097* -4.838 -9.295** 




F 1861.7 777.5 385.2 2209.6 27426.4 8155.1 2802.9 12172.7 439.6 
Observations 146 171 171 146 146 146 146 146 146 
p-values in parentheses * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Sample period: 2006-2015 





Figure 1 – Legislative budgetary power index and its sub-indices 
 








































































Table I. The legislative budgetary power index – indicators, weights and data sources 
Sub-indices Variables Scoring scheme  
(on scale 0-10) 
Weight Data sources 
Formal legislative budgetary power  0.50   
Involvement of the legislature in national budgetary process   0.67  
Legislative 
involvement in MTBF 
• Is the national parliament involved in establishing the budgetary 
objectives/targets and/or projections arising from medium-term 
budgetary framework? 
- only parliament is involved (10); involved with 
other entities (5); not involved (0) 
 0.17 European Commission’s 
MTBF database 
• Is the medium-term plan formally sent, discussed or voted upon by 
parliament? Can parliament approve, reject or amend it? 
- sent, discussed and voted upon by parliament, 
which may approve, reject or amend it (10); sent, 
discussed and voted upon by parliament, which may 
approve or reject, but not amend it (6.7); sent and 
discussed but no vote taken (3.3); sent to parliament 
but no discussion/not sent to parliament (0) 
• Is parliament in charge of monitoring respect of the budgetary 
objectives/targets established according to the medium-term 
budgetary framework in the draft budget? 
- only parliament is involved (10); involved with 
other entities (5); not involved (0) 
• Is the monitoring report presented to parliament? - Yes (10); No (0) 
Legislative 
involvement in fiscal 
rules1 
• Is the national parliament in charge of monitoring compliance to 
the fiscal rule? 
 
- only parliament is involved (10); involved with 
other entities (5); not involved (0) 
 0.17 European Commission’s 
Fiscal rules database 
• Is the national parliament in charge of enforcing compliance with 
the fiscal rule in case of non-compliance? 
- only parliament is in charge (10); in charge with 
other entities (5); not in charge (0) 
• Is a corrective plan presented to parliament in case or risk of non-
compliance with the targets implied by the fiscal rule? 
- Yes (10); No (0) 
Legislative budget 
amendment powers 
• Can parliament propose the annual budget independent from the 
government? 









• What are the formal powers of the Legislature to amend the 
budget proposed by the executive? 
- unrestricted amendment powers (10); 
amendments subject to budget balance constraint 
(7.5); legislature may only decrease existing 
expenditures/revenues (5); legislature can only 
approve or reject the budget as a whole (0) 
• Notwithstanding the formal powers of the legislature to modify 
the budget, is a vote on the budget considered a vote of 
confidence in the government? 




• Does the executive have the power to veto the budget approved 
by the legislature? 
- No (10); Yes, line item veto power (6.7); Yes, 
package veto power (3.3); Yes, both line item and 
package veto powers (0) 
OECD Budget Practices 
and Procedures Survey 
Authors’ questionnaire 
for non-OECD EA 
countries 
 
Reversionary budget • What are the consequences If the budget is not approved by the 
legislature before the start of the fiscal year? 
- government shutdown (10); last year’s budget 
takes effect on interim basis (6.7); executive’s 
budget proposal takes effect on interim basis (3.3); 




changes to the 
budget during 
implementation 
• Executive authority to cut/cancel/rescind spending 
 
- No (10); Yes (score reflects whether authority 
applies to all types of spending; whether thresholds 
apply and whether legislative approval is required 
and if such requirement applies ex-ante or ex-post) 







OECD Budget Practices 
and Procedures Survey 
Authors’ questionnaire 
for non-OECD EA 
countries 
• Power of line ministries to re-allocate funds within their budget 
envelope 
•  
- No (10); Yes (score reflects whether thresholds 
apply and whether legislative approval is required 
and if such requirement applies ex-ante or ex-post) 
• Restrictions on executive authority to increase spending - No (10); Yes (score reflects whether authority 
applies to all types of spending; whether thresholds 
apply and whether legislative approval is required 






• Is legislative authorisation required for off-budget expenditures 
and contingent liabilities? 
- Required for all (10); for most (7.5); for some (5); 
for few (2.5); not required (0) 
 0.17 
Legislative involvement in SGP procedures   0.33  
Discussion of SGP 
documents in the 
legislature 
• Degree of involvement of legislature in the preparation of the 
Stability Programme 
- sent, discussed and voted upon by parliament, 
which may approve, reject or amend it (10); sent, 
discussed and voted upon by parliament, which may 
approve or reject, but not amend it (8); not formally 
sent but derived from a document that has been 
previously approved by parliament (6); sent and 
discussed but no vote taken (4); sent to parliament 
but no discussion (2); not sent to parliament (0) 





Authors’ questionnaire to 
all EA countries 
• Are the following documents discussed in the legislature? Does 
this discussion take place before the discussion in Council or after 
the Council meeting? 
- European Commission/Council Recommendations and 
Opinions on the Stability Programme; 
- European Commission Opinion on the Draft Budgetary Plan;  
- European Commission Opinion/Council Decision on the 
existence of an excessive deficit and the European 
- Yes (score reflects whether discussion is on a 
regular basis; whether it takes place is legislative 
committee/s or in plenary; and whether it takes 





Commission/Council Recommendation to end the excessive 
deficit situation;  
- Recommendation/Decision on the abrogation of the excessive 
deficit procedure. 




Are the following documents discussed in legislative committees? Is 
the budget/finance committee/s involved?  
•  the Stability Programme; 
• the European Commission/Council Recommendations and 
Opinions on the Stability Programme; 
• the European Commission Opinion on the Draft Budgetary Plan; 
• the Opinion/Decision/Recommendation on the excessive deficit; 
• Recommendation/Decision on the abrogation of the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure. 
- Yes (score reflects whether discussion is on a 
regular basis and the committee involved – higher 




on implementation of 
Excessive Deficit 
Procedure 
• Is the Legislature informed on the implementation of Council's 
recommendations to end the excessive deficit situation in your 
country? 
- Yes, informed automatically and any deviations or 
risks thereof are explained (10); informed only in 
case of deviations or risks thereof (6.7); informed 
only if it requests information (3.3); No (0) 
 0.33 
Legislative budget organisational capacity  0.50   
Time available for 
budget scrutiny 
•  Months between submission and approval of the budget by 
parliament 
- more than two months (10); two months (5); less 
than two months (0) 





• Type of committee structures for dealing with the budget 
 
- single committee coordinates process, reviews and 
decides on recommendations by sectoral 
committees (10); single committee coordinates 
process but members from sectoral committees can 
attend meetings (7.5); single committee considers 
budget aggregates and sectoral committees consider 
spending for sector specific appropriations (5); 
budget committee only provides technical assistance 
or not in place (0) 
 0.20 OECD Budget Practices 
and Procedures Survey  
Authors’ questionnaire 
for non-OECD EA 
countries 
 
• Length of tenure of legislators sitting on budget/finance 
committee 
 
• Does the budget/finance committee have the power to request 
witnesses and to question ministers or senior civil servants? 
- Score is sum of the following elements: 
- five years or more (5); electoral term/four years (4); 
two to four years (3); less than two years/variable 
(2); no budget committee in place (0) 
- Yes (5); No/no budget committee in place (0) 
 
Authors’ questionnaire to 




• Is there a specialised budget research office/unit attached to the 
legislature to conduct analyses of the budget?  
• The number of full-time equivalent staff employed by this 
office/unit 
- Score is sum of the following elements: 
- Yes (5); No (0) 
 
- more than 20 (5); more than 10 but less than 20 
(2.5); less than 10 (0) 
 0.20  
 
 
OECD Budget Practices 




Access to budgetary 
information 
• Distinction of new expenditure and revenue measures in budget 
documentation 
- always distinguished (10); sometimes (6); rarely (4); 
never (0) 
 0.20 Authors’ questionnaire 
for non-OECD EA 
countries • Comprehensiveness of budget documentation approved by the 
legislature 
- Inclusion of all of the following (10): financial 
liabilities and assets, state and municipal 
transfers/guarantees, tax expenditures, off-budget 
expenditures and contingents liabilities; most 
included (7.5); some included (5); few included (2.5); 
none included (0) 
• Public availability of budget information, assumptions and 
methodologies 
- Inclusion of various information relating to fiscal 
and macroeconomic projections used in the budget, 
budget circulars, executive budget proposal to the 
legislature and budget approved by legislature, 
medium and long-term fiscal, comprehensive annual 
financial plan including off-budget expenditures and 
extra-budgetary funds and covering all levels of 
government, citizens’ budget and budget guide 
- Most of the above (10); some (6.7); few (3.3); none 
(0) 
 
• Is the Legislature informed on implementation of the budget? - Yes, informed automatically and explanations of 
deviations from budget provided (10); yes but only in 
case of deviations from budget (6.7); informed only 
if it requests information (3.3); No (0) 
Authors’ questionnaire to 
all EA countries 
 
• Is a year-end fiscal report audited by the supreme audit institution 
released within six-months of the end of the fiscal year? 
• Is the audited year-end fiscal report discussed in the legislature? 
- Score is sum of the following elements:  
- Yes (5); No (0) 
 





• How does parliament interact with the fiscal institution in the 
planning stage of the budgetary process? 
- parliament has to audition fiscal council during 
budgetary process (10); generally auditions fiscal 
council but no obligation (5); no interaction (0) 
 0.20 IMF Fiscal Councils 
Dataset 
• Is parliament involved in the appointment and dismissal of 
governing high-level management members of the fiscal 
institution? 
- Yes (score reflects whether appointment and/or 
dismissal is by parliament only or together with 
government or other entity); No (0)  
• Are reports by the fiscal institution submitted to the legislature? - Yes and they constitute an important input in 
legislative budget debates (10); yes but they do not 
constitute an important input in legislative budget 
debates (5); only some reports are 
submitted/reports not submitted but still constitute 
an important input in legislative budget debates 
(2.5); not submitted to the legislature and do not 
Authors’ questionnaire to 





constitute an important input in legislative budget 
debates (0) 
• Can the legislature or its budget/finance committee request the 
leadership of the fiscal institution or its senior staff to provide 
responses to legislative questions? 
- Yes and this takes place at least once a year (10); 
yes but this takes place less than once a year (5); No 
(0) 











Table II. Empirical analysis – variables description and data sources 
Variable Name Variable description Source 
FISCALit 
budget balance as a ratio to GDP General government net lending (+) or net borrowing (-); % of GDP European Commission (2017b) Annual 
macro-economic database (AMECO online)  
ECONit 
% change in real GDP  annual change in GDP at constant prices - 2010 reference levels Authors’ calculations from AMECO online 
unemployment rate unemployment rate; % of civilian labour force AMECO online 
POLit 
legislative election held dummy variable indicating that legislative elections were held in country i in year t  
 margin of majority number of parliamentary seats held by government divided by total (government plus opposition 




government fractionalization index the probability that two deputies picked at random from among the government parties will be of 
different parties 
Inter-American Development Bank (2015) 
Database of Political Institutions 
 Government ideology dummy variable indicating government’s ideological orientation with respect to economic policy: 1 
for right, 2 for centre, 3 for left and 0 where no information is provided (and for countries with 
technocrat governments - Italy 2012, 2013; Greece 2012) 
PRESSUREit 
bailout dummy variable dummy variable indicating that country i was subject to economic adjustment programme/balance 
of payments assistance programme during year t, starting in year when country concerned made 
request for assistance until the country exited the programme 
Authors’ calculations from European 
Commission (2017c) EU Financial 
Assistance; and European Stability 
Mechanism (2017) Financial Assistance 
government debt ratio general government consolidated gross debt; % of GDP AMECO online 
INDEXit   







Produced by the authors 
legislative involvement in MTBF sub-index measuring legislative involvement in MTBF 
legislative involvement in fiscal rules sub-index measuring legislative involvement in fiscal rules 
legislative budgetary amendment 
powers 
sub-index measuring legislative budgetary amendment powers (includes whether vote on the 
budget is considered as a vote of confidence in the government and executive veto powers) 
restrictions on amendment powers component in legislative budgetary amendment powers sub-index – captures whether legislature 
has powers to amend the executive’s draft budget and whether any restrictions apply 
reversionary budgets sub-index measuring reversionary budgets 
legislative control – budget 
implementation 
sub-index measuring legislative authorisation for changes to the budget during implementation 
authorisation of off-budget 
expenditures 
sub-index measuring legislative authorisation of off-budget expenditures and contingent liabilities 
legislative budgetary organisational 
capacity 
sub-index measuring legislative budget organisational capacity 
 
 
